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I. 
responds to at 35 
Respondent's Mr. Conner has his loss consortium claim is a 
wholly derivative cause of action. It IS contingent upon his spouse's success . 
Accordingly, . Conner will again not rp",·nnr.n to arguments 
his spouse, Jami Steinmeyer-Conner, but, instead, incorporates all of her arguments 
herein by reference. 
The following sections of this Reply Brief will follow in the same order as the 
Respondent's Brief beginning at p. 35. 
H. ARGUMENT 
E. Lack of Spousal Relationship. 
Dr. Hodges apparently continues to argue that Jami is the "property" of 
Ryan or, more generally, that consortium is a sort of property interest like the loss of a 
cow or a sheep. This follows from Dr. Hodges' citation to Riggs v. Smith, 52 Idaho 43, 
48, 11 P.2d 358, 360 (1932) (stating consortH "is a property right growing out of the 
marriage '-'L<4UV.U. for loss of 
to to 
to be women 
just as slaves were 
masters to mores 
50th . anniversary King's a speech recently brought 
home the fact that a black man could not share a seat a white man (or woman) on a 
bus just a short time ago. Similary, persons of different races could not live together as 
man and wife in, e.g., Maryland or Virginia in 1965. The concept of social and societal 
changes was amply argued in Ryan's Opening Brief. These changes have resulted in a 
plethora of cases at all state and federal levels. 
Riggs v. Smith, supra, was decided in 1932. Back then in the 30's there was a 
huge outcry when Rhett Butler stated on the silver screen: "Frankly my dear, I don't give 
a damn." Any woman wearing a 2013 bikini bathing suit would have been arrested and 
locked up. And Jim Crow was not only alive and well segregation was judicially 
approved. The point is that a 1932 decision of this Court which did not specifically hold 
that a claim for a loss of consortium could only be brought a man was married to an 
injured spouse is not in any sense immutable bedrock upon which Dr. Hodges can stand. 
Further, it is not questioned by Dr. Hodges that Ryan and Jami are husband and wife. If 
loss of consortium is based upon and requires a marriage relationship as argued by Dr. 
is a marriage relationship. was with 
surgery to 
foreseeability not even reSDOll1a~:a 
",-CUHvlH to say 'VVHH'01 cannot a surgery 
-2 
January 2007 1J'v,",'uuc,,-, were not at 
owe a to 
Hodges' Respondent's Brief states that Mr. Conner has failed to raise, or cite 
any law to support the issue of Dr. Hodges owing him a duty. In the context of a claim 
for a loss of consortium, Dr. Hodges' argument is without merit. 
If Ryan's cause of action is a derivative cause of action and if a duty is owed to 
Jami, then it follows, perforce, that a duty is owed to Mr. Conner. This also touches on 
the issue of foreseeability as previously briefed. Ample law was cited in Jami's 
Appellant's Brief and in Ryan's Appellant's Brief to support the idea that it was 
foreseeable to Dr. Hodges that if he did not proceed carefully with the tubal ligation, not 
only could Jami be injured but a male partner who unintentionally and unwittingly 
fathered a child with Jami would also be affected. 
Ryan has no quarrel with Dr. Hodges' recitation of the four pillars of common 
law negligence in this state. As previously argued, Dr. Hodges had a duty to proceed 
carefully with the tubal ligation, he breached the duty, this established a causal 
follows 
I'"\P1'U1<'''''''' his conduct and 
actual loss or damage 
was no 
strict sense. 
concept a derivative cause 
to (and to 
not seem to one 
Mrs. killing IS 
sight at 
was not 
to negligent act. did not even that Mrs. B was 
since Mrs. B's husband does have a derivative cause of action and since 
there was a owed by Driver to Mrs. the widower is eligible to receive a 
recovery for his loss of consortium if A was negligent. Since it is very clear that Dr. 
Hodges owed a duty to Jami (his patient), then the question becomes whether, in a wholly 
derivative cause of action, that duty extends to the unknown and future spouse. Ryan has 
argued responsibly and cogently that the duty does extend to him through Jami, his 
spouse. 
As for the argument that Ryan has stated no argument on negligence, Ryan has 
stated that his is a derivative cause of action and that his claim will rise and fall on the 
success or lack thereof of Jami's appeal. Ryan stated explicitly at p. 1 of his Appellant's 
Brief that "Jami's arguments on the merits of her case will support the derivative claims 
for loss of consortium." Clearly, this Court does not need redundant briefing. And, just 
as clearly, Ryan's recitation of the facts at pps. 2-4 of that same Appellant's Brief leave 
no Hodges' procedure was negligently perfonned. 
costs on 
specifically rests on § 2-12 argumg 
s -4 
or seems 
IS an 
done so approximately times over the course of 'rn,I_T'''TA years. Ryan's claim, 
while unusual, and, Hl'-''-''-''U, without precedent this state, proceeds upon logic and in 
accordance Idaho concerning foreseeability. Even if Ryan's arguments are 
unsuccessful, it is submitted that they nevertheless reflect a good faith effort to extend the 
law and refine what can be legitimately argued as a species of archaic law stemming from 
husbands' property rights with respect to their wives who were considered at common 
law to be legally little more than the cattle or sheep a husband owned. To limit a loss of 
consortium only to a spouse who is a spouse at the instant of the tort is questionable and 
has been questioned here. 
In other words, if John is engaged to be wed to Jane and the day before the 
wedding Jane is run over by a Greyhound bus and is rendered paraplegic but John 
marries her notwithstanding that horrible injury, can equity or law support the idea that if 
the injury occurred 24 hours later John would have a remedy for loss of consortium but, 
since he was not actually married to Jane at the time of the injury, he has no cause of 
action to compensate 
married life 
seems to 
s 
for what he will go through for the entire course of their 
example is 
nor reason to say that the 
- 5 
an 
a saymg there 
must occur course 
not commence 
state Hodges argues IS absolutely no no 
and is a jury question. so assert is not to engage in and reason 
can support position Ryan asserts. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing arguments, Ryan respectfully requests a reversal of the 
Trial Court's decision and a remand for further proceedings. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 10th day of September, 2013. 
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